Third Circuit Adopts Predominant Benefit Test for Determining When Meal Breaks Must Be Compensated Under the Fair Labor Standards Act

December 17, 2015

by Maria Tavano

Last month, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Babcock v. Butler County adopted the “predominant benefit” test for determining when meal periods must be deemed compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).

Sandra Babcock, a corrections officer at the Butler County Prison in Butler, Pennsylvania, filed a putative class action alleging Butler County improperly failed to pay her, and those similarly situated to her, overtime under the FLSA by failing to compensate the corrections officers for a portion of their meal periods.

According to the decision, Butler County Prison corrections officers work eight and one-quarter-hour shifts, which includes a one-hour meal break. Under the terms of the relevant collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), forty-five minutes of the one-hour meal break are paid and fifteen minutes are unpaid. The CBA also imposes constraints on what corrections officers can and cannot do during the meal break. Corrections officers remain on call for emergencies during the meal period and, therefore, must remain in uniform and in close proximity to emergency response equipment. They are not permitted to leave the prison during the meal break without permission from the warden or deputy warden and are not permitted to go outside or smoke cigarettes.

Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the employer-imposed constraints, they were not able to perform many personal activities during the break and, if an emergent situation arose, had to immediately respond. Because of the restrictions, Plaintiffs alleged they should have been compensated for the entire meal break period.

Butler County filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the meal breaks were not compensable because the corrections officers received the “predominant benefit” of the meal period. The district court agreed and dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Third Circuit (covering Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands) noted two tests have been adopted by other circuit courts: the “predominant benefit” test and the “relieved from all duties” test. Without much analysis at all, the appellate court formally adopted the “predominant benefit” test, also adopted by a majority of other circuits, which looks to whether the employee or employer receives the benefit of the meal break.

In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit instructed that the inquiry should be made on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that most circuit courts have rejected applying a literal reading of a Department of Labor regulation that states an employee is not relieved from duty for a meal break if he is required to perform any - even inactive - duties while eating. Instead, the Third Circuit, citing the Eleventh Circuit, counseled that “the essential consideration for determining whether a meal period is a bona fide meal period or compensable rest period is whether the employees are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”

In applying that standard to the facts alleged in the pleadings, the Third Circuit found that on balance, even with the imposed restrictions, the corrections officers received the predominant benefit of the meal break. The court appears to have found particularly persuasive the facts that the Butler County corrections officers could request authorization to leave the prison for their meal break and that in the event mealtimes were interrupted, the officers were entitled to overtime pay under the terms of the controlling CBA.

While the Third Circuit may have unanimously adopted the “predominant benefit” test, the court split on the application of the test to the facts of the case. The dissent criticized the majority opinion for reaching such a fact-sensitive decision without giving the plaintiffs the benefit of discovery. It found the majority relied too heavily on the terms of the CBA and ignored Supreme Court precedent defining “work” under the FLSA as any “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.” The dissent reasoned the analysis should depend, at least in part, on the degree to which the employee is free to engage in personal activities during the break time and concluded the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to state a claim under the FLSA.

While the court may have been split on its application, the Third Circuit unequivocally adopted the “predominant benefit” test for determining whether a meal period must be compensated under the FLSA. Third Circuit employers may look to Babcock for guidance on that issue, particularly when requiring employees to remain in some on-call function during the meal break.